August 2026 · Commercial

You don't know why you won

Most companies never ask their customers why they were chosen. The ones that do ask usually ask badly, with a preferred answer already in mind. That is a shame, because the answer is frequently not in the sales material — and in long-lived purchases it is frequently not technical at all.

I have won deals I was not the favourite to win, in banking and in software both. On the occasions where the relationship later allowed the question, I asked the client directly: why us? The answers were rarely the ones I expected, and seldom the ones on the slide we had presented.

This should be more troubling than it usually is. A company that does not know why it wins cannot deliberately win again. It can only repeat the whole performance and hope the part that mattered was included.

The specification is the entry ticket, not the decision

Let me be exact about what I am not saying. The specification has to be right. In any serious enterprise purchase there is a technical bar, it is real, and being wrong about the customer's own process does not survive contact with the people who run it. If you cannot describe a buyer's operation back to them more clearly than they described it to you, nothing else in this essay will save you.

But notice what that bar actually is. It is a filter, not a ranking. By the time a serious process reaches its final stage, the remaining vendors have all cleared it. Everyone in the room can do the job. The specification has stopped discriminating, and something else has to carry the decision — which means that something else is carrying it whether or not anybody in the room can name it.

Everyone left in the room can do the job. So the thing that decides is, by definition, not the thing everyone can do.

In a transactional purchase what carries it is usually price, or convenience, or an existing contract. But in a purchase the buyer cannot easily unwind — a system that runs a factory floor, a platform that moves a corporation's cash, a record the business cannot operate without for a single day — price is close to irrelevant. I have watched buyers choose the more expensive option without apparent difficulty, and I have watched a lower price actively raise suspicion.

What they are actually buying

What decides it, in my experience, is a judgment the buyer rarely says out loud: who am I going to be speaking to every week for the next decade?

That is not sentiment. It is a rational assessment of the residual risk after diligence has done its work. Diligence establishes that the product can do the job today. It cannot establish what happens in year three when the requirement changes, or in year six when something breaks at an inconvenient moment, or in year eight when the buyer's own organisation has been restructured twice and the original sponsor has left. Those events are certain. What is uncertain is how the vendor will behave when they arrive.

So the buyer prices the vendor's character, using the only evidence available: how the vendor behaved during the sale. Whether they said "we can't do that" when they couldn't. Whether they were straight about the gaps in the current version. Whether the people in the room were the people who would actually do the work. Whether anyone made a promise on a timeline nobody in the room believed.

Every one of those is a small demonstration, and buyers are extremely good at reading them, because they have been burned before by vendors who were excellent until the contract was signed.

This is the commercial case for culture

Culture gets discussed as a value, a poster, an engagement score. In a long-cycle business it is none of those things. It is the asset that decides purchases once the specification has stopped being a differentiator — which is to say, it decides the purchases that matter most, the ones with the longest revenue tails and the highest switching costs.

That reframes what culture is for. It is not primarily an internal comfort. It is the thing the customer is underwriting when they commit to a decade of dependency, and it shows up in the accounts as win rate in competitive final rounds, as renewal, as expansion, and as the deals you were not supposed to win.

In shorter-lived and more transactional businesses the same function tends to be served by brand — a promise, made in advance and at scale, about what dealing with you will be like. Brand is culture for people who will never meet you. The mechanism is identical; only the delivery differs.

Ask, and ask badly at your peril

The practical part is the asking, and it is harder than it looks, because there are two ways to get it wrong.

The first is not asking at all, which is the common case. A win produces relief and then motion — onboarding, delivery, the next opportunity — and the question of why never gets asked while the answer is still fresh. Losses get post-mortems. Wins get celebrated and filed.

The second is asking with a preferred answer. A buyer who likes you will happily tell you what you appear to want to hear; it costs them nothing and it is a pleasant conversation. If you arrive hoping the answer is your product architecture, you will hear about the architecture. You will then invest in the architecture, and you will have learned precisely the wrong lesson from a good outcome.

That is the expensive version of this mistake. A flattering explanation for a win costs more than an uncomfortable one, because it does not sit inert — it teaches you to repeat the wrong thing, with conviction, at scale.

The questions that work are the ones that make it easy to say something unwelcome. Who else was in the final round, and what did they do better than us? What nearly stopped you choosing us? Was there a moment when you decided, and what happened just before it? Who in your organisation was hardest to convince, and what convinced them? Then stop talking, and let the silence do the rest.

Both halves can be built

The useful conclusion is not that culture beats capability. It is that both are constructed, deliberately, over years — and that you cannot invest sensibly in either until you know which one is currently carrying you.

A company that believes it wins on product, but actually wins on trust, will over-invest in engineering and under-invest in the people who go into the room — and will slowly stop winning, without ever understanding why. A company that believes it wins on relationships, but actually wins on a genuine technical edge, will hire more relationship managers and watch the edge decay. Both failures look like bad luck from the inside. Neither is.

So ask. And when the answer is not the one you were hoping for, that is the moment the exercise has paid for itself.